Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship

2011

Does It Matter What We Say About Legal
Interpretation?
Karen Petroski
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons
Recommended Citation
Petroski, Karen. Does It Matter What We Say About Legal Interpretation? (2011).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.

DOES IT MATTER WHAT WE SAY
ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION?
Karen Petroski*
Despite a common interest in justifying their scholarly output, legal academics have
resisted seeing how their work is molded by the institutional environment in which it is produced,
and not just by legal doctrine, ideology, or individual perspectives. This paper presents a case
study from this neglected perspective, considering the shape of scholarship on legal
interpretation in light of the social conditions of its production. After a brief discussion of the
debates over whether scholarship (and which scholarship) matters, the paper explores how such
concerns are addressed in various academic accounts of scholars’ textual practices. It then
offers some initial conclusions from an original study of the 154 most-cited articles on legal
interpretation published in American law reviews. Early framings of the subject shaped later
work in familiar ways. But the patterns disclosed by the citation relationships among the articles
suggest some surprising conclusions. Scholars working in the area seem to understand their
contributions in a way that is at odds with the institutional dynamics of their efforts. These
patterns further indicate that legal academics’ failure to develop a specifically legal scholarly
discourse, in some respects a strength of legal scholarship, may carry seldom-noted risks in
work on this topic.
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INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the value of legal scholarship have been around a long time. In part, such
concerns are symptoms of a recurring crisis in Western higher education. In part, however, they
are specific to the legal academy, which generates a growing volume of scholarship each year1
and occupies a unique position in American higher education, with traditionally close ties to the
nonacademic world of legal practice and politics.
Debates about the value of scholarship on the subject of legal interpretation have not
always been as contentious; there is some indication that nonacademic legal professionals find
such scholarship directly relevant to their work.2 But the question is as acute in this subject area
as any other. Indeed, some legal scholarship addressing issues of interpretation may be not
useless, but positively counterproductive. The specific nature of this risk becomes clearest if we
consider not only the effects that legal scholarship has on the nonacademic world—the
traditional focus of arguments concerning the value of legal scholarship—but also the conditions
of production of that scholarship, especially as those conditions are legible in the material
records of scholarly efforts, scholarly publications themselves.
The first half of this paper contextualizes this inquiry. Part I outlines the debate over the
value of scholarship, briefly describing its history in the legal context, its analogues in wider
debates about the role of the academy, and the institutional peculiarities of the legal academy that
complicate the debates in this context. Part II explores approaches to critical analysis of the
production of scholarship, especially the patterns exhibited by scholarly textual practices,
including citation. The focus is on approaches previously neglected in legal scholars’ selfanalysis, especially from the fields of sociology, information science, and communications.
Curiously, despite legal academics’ acute self-awareness, sustained desire to legitimate their

1

For example, the Hein Online journal database indexed 33,847 articles in 2008, 12,342 in 1968, 4,629 in 1928,
and 1,734 in 1908.
2
See Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the
Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 872, 882-83 (1996) (finding that scholarship on statutory
interpretation more frequently appears on lists of articles most cited by both judges and legal academics than
scholarship on other topics); see also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation
Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9, 11-14, 20-22 (2000) (confirming
conclusions of Merritt & Putnam). But see Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation (draft
Aug. 29, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669381 (arguing that scholarly debates about constitutional
interpretation have “low stakes,” i.e., little likelihood of affecting adjudicated outcomes).
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scholarly efforts, and comfort with interdisciplinary work, the forms of bibliometric analysis
used to study disciplinary structures outside law have rarely been trained on the legal field, and
never by legal scholars.
The second half of the paper explores specific features of legal scholarship in a particular
research area. Based on an original study of the 154 most-cited articles on general topics in legal
interpretation published in American law reviews from the nineteenth century on, Part III begins
with a description of the field. Two pieces, an 1893 article by James Bradley Thayer and an
1899 essay by Oliver Wendell Holmes, defined themes that have shaped the content and
rhetorical tactics of the literature down to the present. Part III also examines two developments
not anticipated in these pieces: the withering of interest in contract interpretation, at least
described as such, after the 1960s, and the explosion, a few decades later, of interest in judicial
deference to agency interpretations. Part IV focuses on features of the citation network created
by the articles. These features support considering legal interpretation a coherent “interest area”
but also suggest special, seldom-remarked peculiarities of the area. Among other things, the
patterns disclosed by the network suggest that academics working in this area may not well
understand the social and cultural dynamics of their efforts, and that as they respond to the
institutional pressures inherent in their position, they erode their own claims to expertise in
unexpected ways.

I. THE DEBATE OVER THE VALUE OF SCHOLARSHIP
A. A Brief Introduction to the Debate Over Legal Scholarship
Academic law reviews, the primary publication outlet for the writing of law professors,
emerged in something like their current form in the last few decades of the nineteenth century.3
Legal professionals and academics almost immediately questioned the value of their contents.
By 1906, when the Index to Legal Periodicals cited a mere 60 sources (compared to 1,025
today), a commentator had already called the law review field “overcrowded” and noted that the

3

On the emergence of law reviews, see especially Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins,
Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739 (1985); see also Bernard
J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615 (1996).
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reviews published little of “interest” to most “practicing lawyers.”4
The legal realists carried this critique through the first few decades of the twentieth
century. The best-known realist-affiliated attack was Fred Rodell’s 1930 article Goodbye to Law
Reviews.5 Rodell emphasized the formality and narrow subject-matter of the articles published
in law reviews, and his complaints were echoed by some judges, including Oliver Wendell
Holmes.6 The same features criticized by Rodell, however, made at least some academic legal
writing attractive to lawyers and judges.7 And over the first half of the twentieth century,
judicial opinions cited law review articles more and more often.8 Celebrated examples of
influential scholarship include Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article describing a
legal right to privacy9 and the Supreme Court’s reliance, in the 1938 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins10
decision, on Charles E. Warren’s study of an eighteenth-century statute to overrule a nearly
century-old Supreme Court precedent.11
The nature of critiques of legal scholarship shifted later in the twentieth century. Some
judges, defending legal scholarship, have continued to sound familiar themes regarding the
4

Frederic C. Woodward, Editorial Notes, 1 ILL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1906), discussed in Howard Denemark, How
Valid Is the Often-Repeated Accusation That There Are Too Many Legal Articles and Too Many Law Reviews?, 30
AKRON L. REV. 215, 217 (1996).
5
Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1937).
6
Charles E. Hughes described both Holmes’s attitude and its eventual eclipse: “[T]hirty years ago Mr. Justice
Holmes would refer somewhat scornfully to the ‘notes’ in law school reviews which ventured . . . to criticise
pronouncements of the Supreme Court. . . . But . . . there has been a growing regard for these ‘notes’ as helpful
analyses of decisions.” Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941).
7
See id.; see also Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
FROM AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGAL PERIODICALS ix (Assoc. of Am. L. Sch. ed., 1931) (“[L]eadership in the
march of legal thought has been passing in our day from the benches . . . to the chairs of universities. . . .”);
Frederick Evan Crane, Law School Reviews and the Courts, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1935); Learned Hand, Have
the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 466, 467 (1926).
8
See, e.g., Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the
Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189 (1930); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United
States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (1959); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1359-80
(2001) (discussing history of and shifts in Supreme Court citation of legal academic work).
9
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). On the
influence of this article, see, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 316 (1989).
10
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11
Charles E. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49
(1923). For a discussion of the influence of Warren’s article on Erie, see, e.g., Newland, supra note 8, at 481-82. A
more recent example, almost as often noted, is the influence on due process doctrine of Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), discussed in, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 893
(2009).
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experimentation inherent in the system of production of this scholarship and the resulting wealth
of ideas it may offer.12 But changes in the academy have made new kinds of skepticism
possible. Increased self-awareness about interdisciplinary scholarship has generated dispute
about the standards appropriate to the evaluation of legal scholarship and the extent to which
interdisciplinary efforts by law professors remain “legal.”13 And both interdisciplinary work and
more traditional pieces focusing exclusively on legal doctrine appear to some critics to betray a
growing disparity in interests and expertise between practicing lawyers and legal academics.14
Aided by machine-searchable databases, some legal scholars have also sought to justify
their work in new ways, in particular by taking judicial citations of legal scholarship as a
measure of the scholarship’s value. In general, the findings of such studies support the critics of
legal scholarship; in most respects, citations of legal scholarship by courts and by legal scholars
follow different patterns, indicating that academics value different forms of scholarship than
judges do.15 But judges and legal academics do tend to cite similar articles in certain subject
areas, including legal interpretation, and specifically, statutory interpretation.16 The conventional
explanation of this phenomenon17 is that on this topic (along with constitutional law topics),
scholars’ interest in theory18 converges with judges’ and lawyers’ interest in principles directly
12

See, e.g., Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 916 (1953) (observing
that “the ‘fantastically non-utilitarian’ law review type brief, exhaustive and analytical, affording a broad vista of the
law, serves as a real aid to judicial decision”); Kaye, supra note 9, at 315; Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about
Legal Scholarship, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 295 (2000) (describing himself as “big fan of legal scholarship”).
13
See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1996); Philip C.
Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 252-54 (1988); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond
Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992).
14
See, e.g., United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (“[M]any of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch
faculty members. . . .”). See also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 Yale L.J.
1193, 1193 (1981); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 307-08 (1987); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge’s View of
Practice-Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 73, 44 (1986) (expressing “worry about law reformers
who do not know how the law works”).
15
Courts, for example, cite more articles on state law, fewer articles from critical legal studies perspectives,
more articles from less elite reviews, and more articles from nonscholarly authors (practitioners, judges) than legal
scholars do. Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 885-96.
16
Id. at 802, 882-83. See also Crespi, supra note 2, at 11-14, 20-22.
17
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 9-10; Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 882.
18
See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Howard J. Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law
Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30
SUFFOLK L. REV. 353, 370 (1996) (concluding that law review articles have been growing increasingly theoretical
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As the discussion below suggests, this explanation, while

reasonable, fails to account for other troublesome features of the scholarship in this area.

B. The Debate Over the Academy
Many concerns about the value of legal scholarship parallel anxieties about the functions
of higher education generally. These anxieties are as old as Western culture but assumed many
of their modern characteristics in the twentieth century.20

The debate concerns the social

function of the university, and more especially the legitimacy of academics’ activities, including
the scholarship they produce. It is largely carried on in instrumentalist terms: what norms
should we use to assess the activities and output of universities and academics? And it is often
structured around an opposition between a traditional set of disciplines and values associated
with culture, the humanities, and the arts, on the one hand, and a more explicitly instrumental set
of values associated with the sciences and applied technical fields, on the other.
The arts-sciences opposition in its current form is often credited to the English physicist
and novelist C.P. Snow’s mid-twentieth-century account of the “two cultures,” which he
identified with literary studies and the sciences.21 Snow lamented the “mutual incomprehension”
between the two cultures, identified the sciences as the only site of genuine intellectual and
social progress, and urged greater political support and resources for the development of the
academic sciences.22 In a public debate with Snow, the Cambridge literary critic F.R. Leavis
criticized Snow’s identification of literary culture with political power and argued for the
transformative power of the humanities.23
A series of analogous debates has played out in the United States over the second half of
the twentieth century as the academy has weathered several bitter crises. In the 1960s, these

since the 1960s).
19
See sources cited supra note 2; see also, e.g., Thomas L. Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in Judicial Opinions:
A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 547, 547 (2006).
20
See GERARD DELANTY, CHALLENGING KNOWLEDGE: THE UNIVERSITY IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 1-11
(2001).
21
C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND A SECOND LOOK (1963). Snow originally delivered his lecture on the
topic in 1959 at the University of Cambridge. For a discussion of the debate in context, see Guy Ortolano, Two
Cultures, One University: The Institutional Origins of the “Two Cultures” Controversy, 34:4 ALBION 606 (2002).
22
SNOW, supra note 21, at 4.
23
See F.R. LEAVIS, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF C.P. SNOW (1962).
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who should have the power to allocate

resources within the university?24 In the 1980s and 1990s, resource struggles were joined by
challenges to the continuing validity of Snow’s dichotomy, most visibly in the “canon wars”
over the construction of new humanities curricula25 and the “science wars” over the legitimacy of
the sciences considered from a humanistic perspective.26 In the last decade, the focus of debate
has shifted back to resource allocation. As public support for higher education institutions has
declined, the institutions have had to suspend or terminate departments; most often, the
downsized departments have been humanities departments.27
These developments have prompted a great outpouring of critical commentary for a
general audience. As Snow and Leavis did decades ago, academics and advocates have justified
competing claims to resources by differentiating the activities of different groups within the
academy, in part based on those groups’ own descriptions of their activities, and attempting to
show which have the best claims to social legitimacy.28 They have also sought to show that the
university, as a whole, serves social functions distinct from those served by other institutions.29
Such arguments take different forms when made by or for groups within the academy—like law
and business schools—that have direct links to professional groups in the non-academic society.

C. Special Features of the Legal Academy
Since the late nineteenth century, most American law schools have been situated within

24

See, e.g., Walter P. Metzger, The Crisis of Academic Authority, 99:3 DAEDALUS 568 (1970); DELANTY, supra
note 20, at 2.
25
For an overview, see Rachel Donadio, Revisiting the Canon Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/books/review/Donadio-t.html.
26
Prominent contributions from the Snow point of view were PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER
SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); Alan D. Sokal, Transgressing the
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 SOCIAL TEXT 217 (1996)
(offering scandalous spoof of humanistic critique of scientific work).
27
See, e.g., Budget-Cutting Colleges Bid Some Languages Adieu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/education/05languages.html.
28
See, e.g., JONATHAN R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO PREEMINENCE, ITS
INDISPENSABLE NATIONAL ROLE, WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED (2010); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT:
WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES (2010).
29
See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY
AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING (2001); DELANTY, supra note 20; LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010).
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institutions of higher education, but outside colleges of arts and sciences.30 So it is not surprising
that debates about the purposes and value of higher education would be echoed in the law school
context, even where they did not concern the legal academy directly. But because of the peculiar
place of law schools in the academy and the society, discussions of the value of legal scholarship
encounter unique problems.
American law schools most basically differ from schools of arts and sciences in that most
of their students attend law schools specifically to be eligible for professional licensing.31 In
addition, law school faculty have traditionally not been trained as academic professionals, but
have received the same training as those students who become lawyers (although recent hiring
trends may be eroding this tradition).32 And unlike other academics, law school faculty are
expected to publicize their research largely through student-edited journals, rather than the peerreviewed journals common in other disciplines.33 As a result, decisions about which scholarship
will be published, and where, are mostly made not by academics but by students in training to
become non-academic professionals.34
Debate concerning this last practice shades easily into, and complicates, debates about the
purposes of legal scholarship. If those purposes are understood to be primarily educational and
instrumental—the education of law students35 and the persuasion of lawmakers and judges36—

30

See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1885 (1992); Linda R.
Crane, Interdisciplinary Combined-Degree and Graduate Law Degree Programs: History and Trends, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 47, 53 (1999).
31
See ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SURVEY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 86-95 (1953).
32
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 885; John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives in
Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons, 2 PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE LAW: WHAT ARE LAW
SCHOOLS FOR? (1996).
33
See, e.g., Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 268 (1990);
Deborah Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2002); Ronald D. Rotunda, Law Reviews—The
Extreme Centrist Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1986). For criticism of these practices, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 58; Natalie C. Cotton, Comment, The Competence of
Students as Editors of Law Reviews: A Response to Judge Posner, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 951 (2006).
34
Some believe that these decisions also determine which pieces will have the most impact. See, e.g., Merritt &
Putnam, supra note 2, at 889-90 (finding that scholars are more likely than courts to cite pieces that appeared in
prestigious journals). But see Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or Beauty
Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 375 (2006) (arguing that high-quality articles are cited regardless of the review’s
prestige); Rotunda, supra note 33, at 8 (similar).
35
See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 33, at 4.
36
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131 (1981); Edward L. Rubin,
The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1850 (1988).
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then it makes sense to continue the tradition of student editing. If, on the other hand, law
reviews are conceived as providing the primary outlet for legal academics’ scholarship, and if
that scholarship is thought of as analogous to the scholarship produced by academics in other
parts of the university, the use of student editors as gatekeepers may come to seem problematic.37
Consensus on the functions of law reviews is elusive, in part, because of a more basic
ambiguity in the law school’s situation at the intersection of two heavily discursive professional
systems: that of law and that of the academy. This positioning is reflected in the other
institutional characteristics of American law schools and creates confusion about legal
academics’ role in the shaping of professional and cultural discourses, and about the status and
purposes of legal scholarship. Traditional doctrinal scholarship, which largely treats the two
professional systems involved as one, is characterized by a “unity of discourse” with professional
legal discourse: doctrinal scholarship mimics the form, rhetoric, and normative purpose of legal
advocacy and judicial opinions.38

But legal academics have been producing non-doctrinal

scholarship, as well, at least since the early twentieth century.39 This type of scholarship, which
can be called interdisciplinary, is modeled on the scholarship produced by non-legal academics,
and it is not always clear what makes such scholarship specifically “legal.” Surveying these
practices, some have concluded that there really is no such thing as “legal scholarship,” but only
professional legal discourse, on the one hand, and non-legal scholarship, on the other, each to be
evaluated by the norms of a different professional system.40

Those who disagree, contending

that a specifically “legal scholarship” does exist, remain divided about where such scholarship
fits into the Snow universe—whether it is a humane discipline,41 a social science,42 or something
else.
Unless these points are settled, defenses of the value of legal scholarship have little hope
of succeeding. Practice alone seems unlikely to settle them. Not surprisingly, legal academics
have drawn on a variety of scholarly resources in attempts to address the issue, including the
37

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1002, 1007 n.17 (1991).
Rubin, supra note 36, at 1859-60.
39
See, e.g., Max Radin, Scientific Method and Law, 19 Cal. L. Rev. 164 (1931).
40
This position has been noted by, e.g., Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1131, 1132 n.4 (1987); Balkin, supra note 13, at 967; Rubin, supra note 36, at 1835.
41
See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 13, at 962.
42
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 30, at 1900.
38
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vocabularies and structures of not just political and legal advocacy43 but also those of AngloAmerican philosophy,44 continental philosophy,45 cultural studies,46 qualitative sociology,47 and
descriptive economics.48

Oddly, legal academics seem so far not to have consulted the

considerable body of academic work on the social, institutional, and material features of
scholarship systems. This is the focus of Part II.

II. ACADEMIC INQUIRY AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON
Scholarly approaches to the study of academic practices have taken three main forms.
The first approach, a conceptual one, borrows from (and contributes to) philosophical inquiry,
especially the philosophy of science. In addition to Snow, this approach is associated with the
work of Thomas S. Kuhn and those influenced by him. The other two approaches use methods
associated with the social sciences: interpretive studies based on interviews or participantobserver fieldwork, and studies of the material records of scholarly work, especially their formal
characteristics, sometimes called “bibliometrics.”49 This Part discusses the relations among
these three approaches, then considers the oddly limited scope of legal scholarship on textual
practices in general and scholarly texts in particular.

A. Social Science Accounts of Academic Inquiry
1.

Conceptual and Participant-Based Approaches
Most contemporary conceptual approaches to the study of the dynamics of academic
43

See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 36, at 1131; Alexander, supra note 30, at 1898, Chemerinsky, supra note 11,
at 886-93; David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: Law
Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK L. REV. 761, 764
(2005); Rotunda, supra note 33, at 2.
44
See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 37.
45
See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 36; Pierre Schlag, The Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
46
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 13.
47
See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audiences, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 569 (1992).
48
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 36; George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failures of Modern Legal Scholarship and
the Conditions of Its Production, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 725 (1992); George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary
Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1929 (1993).
49
Fred Shapiro defined “bibliometrics” for a law-review audience as “studies which seek to quantify the
processes of written communication.” Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540,
1541 n.8 (1985) (quoting 12 AM. REV. INFO. SCI. & TECH. 35 (1977)). See generally NICOLA DE BELLIS,
BIBLIOMETRICS AND CITATION ANALYSIS: FROM THE SCIENCE CITATION INDEX TO CYBERMETRICS (2009).
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inquiry acknowledge the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Kuhn questioned traditional understandings of the nature of scientific progress, like
Snow’s. Such progress, according to Kuhn, does not involve just the gradual accumulation of
new information and techniques, building on previous insights, but also occasional “paradigm
shifts” based on radically new conceptualizations of the world and our interaction with it. In the
periods between such shifts, scientists engage in “normal science,” expanding the applications of
the currently dominant paradigms through “puzzle-solving.”50
Kuhn’s account has gained wide (though not universal) acceptance as an accurate and
fruitful way of thinking about intellectual change in general.51 Although many legal academics
are familiar with Kuhn and his basic ideas,52 they have not made much use of some of the
elaborations of these ideas by others. Much Kuhn-influenced work has explored the social
dimensions of particular paradigm shifts: the ways in which the reception and dissemination of
scholarly ideas and their expressions are shaped by social as well as conceptual factors. The
“science studies” school examines how specific scientific and technological changes depend on
improbable convergences of political and economic resources, personal ties, and communication
systems.53 (This and similar work sparked the “science wars” mentioned earlier.) Sociologist
Randall Collins has blended Kuhnian and other frameworks to explain the global development
and recurrence of schools of philosophical thought as a matter of interpersonal ties and
institutional settings.54
In recent decades, social scientists have increasingly studied these details of the social
setting of academic work, and the relations among different types of academic work, through
interviews, questionnaires, and participant observation. A good example is Tony Becher’s

50

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
See, e.g., RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL
CHANGE 537 (1998).
52
See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 42 DUKE L.J. 840
(1993); Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Rubin, supra note 13, at 957.
53
See, e.g., Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the
Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 196 (John Law
ed., 1986); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC
FACTS (1979).
54
COLLINS, supra note 51, at 129.
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highly regarded 1989 study of “academic tribes and territories.”55 Based on interviews with 220
academics in the United Kingdom and United States, Becher proposed a taxonomy of
disciplinary sub-institutions based on their characteristics along two dimensions, the cognitive
and the social. Becher suggested that cognitively, disciplines are either predominantly “hard”
(quantitative and cumulative, with research questions determined by available technologies) or
“soft” (qualitative and controversial, less determined by technique) and either “pure” (selfregulating) or “applied” (regulated by outside interests).56 Socially, he described disciplines as
either “convergent” (maintaining uniform standards and a stable elite) or “divergent” (marked by
disputation and often valuing the unorthodox) and either “urban” (marked by intense
communication among a small number of researchers, with quick resolution of mutually
recognized problems) or “rural” (marked by more dispersed researchers and slower recognition
and resolution of problems).57 Becher’s study is valuable because it adds detail to Snow’s “two
cultures” taxonomy, allowing greater specificity about the position of law schools in the
contemporary academy. In Becher’s view (supported by Fiona Cownie’s more recent work on
legal academia in the United Kingdom),58 law as an academic discipline is cognitively unique in
that it is soft and applied (the only other applied disciplines Becher identifies are pharmacology
and engineering);59 socially, it is divergent60 and rural.61

Interestingly, considered under

Becher’s scheme, law as a profession would seem to bear different characteristics; indeed, as a
profession, Western law might be considered the paradigmatic “convergent” discourse.62
One limitation of Becher’s work is that it presents a snapshot of academic “tribes” at a
moment in time and does not try to explain why a variety of disciplinary cultures might
originally have developed. Others have tried to do so. Sociologist Andrew Abbott, for example,
has argued that the social and cultural conditions present in the late nineteenth-century United

55

TONY BECHER, ACADEMIC TRIBES AND TERRITORIES: INTELLECTUAL ENQUIRY AND THE CULTURES OF
DISCIPLINES (1989).
56
Id. at 152-71.
57
Id.
58
FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS: CULTURE AND IDENTITIES (2004).
59
BECHER, supra note 55, at 155.
60
Id. at 156.
61
Id. at 158.
62
Cf. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF THE
LAW: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007).
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States generated the constellation of arts and sciences disciplines that still structure the American
university—and that concerns about overspecialization and the need for interdisciplinary
conversations are just as old as this arrangement.63 (Abbott does not analyze law schools, but it
would appear that the same is true of them.) Abbott attributes this stability to academic hiring
practices and more basic social psychological dynamics. But according to him, this institutional
stability breeds conceptual dynamism: within each discipline, and among them, other pressures,
including the logical consequences of the division of labor in any sphere, the drive to seek status,
and competition for resources, impel an “endlessly proliferating lineage structure” of academic
subspecialties, which Abbott describes as “fractal” in shape.64 Drawing on his own prior work
on the sociology of professions, Abbott notes that “differentiation[] along the lines of ‘purity’ is
quite general to knowledge-based occupations,” like academia; “specialists . . . tend to withdraw
into pure work,” particularly when their authority or expertise is challenged by others.65 This
tendency is true of both academic professionals and other professionals, including lawyers.66

2.

Network and Bibliometric Approaches
According to Abbott, academics are under constant pressure to “find[] new areas of

things to know,” and they do so by “rearrang[ing their] fractal allegiances,” redefining and
recombining conceptual and rhetorical distinctions previously drawn within and between
disciplines to justify the continuing division of academic labor.67 A good example of this kind of
bridge building in the academy is the study of network properties, which draws upon a variety of
traditional fields of inquiry and has “exploded across the academic spectrum” over the past
several decades.68 Early on, those studying networks turned their attention to networks of
communications, including the networks formed by citation references in academic publications.
The study of large networks of this kind was assisted by the creation, in the 1960s, of machine63

ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES 122 n.1, 122-26, 136 (2001).
Id. at 130, 147-52.
65
Id. at 22; see also id. at 146-47.
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See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY IN THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 8-9
(1988).
67
Id. at 230-31.
68
Duncan J. Watts, The “New” Science of Networks, 30 ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 243, 243 (2004). On the
development of the field, see LINTON C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A STUDY
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (2004).
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searchable periodicals indexing databases modeled on the Shepard’s citation system familiar to
lawyers since the late nineteenth century.69 But despite the filial relation between legal text
practices and this area of academic research, many legal academics are unfamiliar with some of
the central developments in the field.
A pivotal figure in the study of academic citation networks was the physicist and
information scientist Derek de Solla Price.70 In 1965 Price published an analysis of several
“citation summaries” of publications in scientific journals, assessing patterns in the frequency
with which the publications cited earlier publications in the population.71 One of his enduring
findings was that citation practices follow power laws, that is, a very small number of papers
receive the vast majority of citations from later papers.72 Considering the shifts in the identity of
heavily cited papers over time, Price coined the term “research front” to describe their
significance and suggested that “it is the existence of a research front, in this sense, that
distinguishes the sciences from the rest of scholarship.”73 As this language indicates, Price was
writing within a paradigm inspired by Snow’s dichotomy and vision of science as cumulative.74
Other scholars, discussed below, have developed Price’s speculations about the
possibility of differentiating among disciplines based on the patterns of citation in their
literatures.

In his own later work, Price focused mainly on identifying additional general

principles. One was the phenomenon of “cumulative advantage processes,” or the principle “that
success seems to breed success,” which, Price contended, applies across scholarly areas.75 In this
work, Price showed that citation frequencies are determined not by the contents of cited works so
much as “the past history of the cited paper; . . . citations are generated by a pull mechanism

69

See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1540-42.
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from previous citation rather than from a push mechanism of the papers that do the citing.”76
Citation frequency counts reflect the circumstances surrounding the generation and especially the
past scholarly treatment of particular scholarly efforts.77 This does not mean frequency counts
are meaningless; they might not measure merit, but they are “a rough measure of the writings
which have had the most extensive impact.”78 Thus, this principle supports, at the level of
concrete textual features, the Kuhn-derived analysis of the social determinants of intellectual
change.

The cumulative advantage principle, together with the power-law distribution of

citations, also led Price to develop the notion of “invisible colleges,”79 defined as “the
hierarchical elite resulting from an expectable inequality” produced by these two principles.80
Elites of this kind exhibit “total undemocracy,” according to Price, but are not caused by
deliberate domination; “the phenomenon is . . . a mechanism thrown up automatically by the
scientific community.”81
Others have pursued the implications of Price’s hints at a taxonomy of disciplinary
citation practices. One of the most comprehensive such studies, by Lowell Hargens, compared
scholarly citation networks in seven research areas to test Price’s hypothesis that disciplinary
reference patterns tend to fall into two forms:82 a research-front model, which “focus[es] on
recently published research while tending to ignore foundational work”83 and corresponds to
Kuhn’s normal science and Becher’s hard and convergent disciplines, and a model of work that
76

Id. at 304-05.
For a parallel account of legal citation practices that does not cite Price or use similar methods, see J.M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 845 (1996)
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Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1543-54 (1991)
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tends to “pursue questions raised in classic texts or exegesis”84 of those texts, associated with
Becher’s soft and divergent disciplines.85

Hargens’s study, echoing Becher’s qualitative

approach to the relations among disciplines, suggested that Price’s dichotomy was too basic.
While papers on natural science subjects do cite recently published work more often than papers
on humanities and behavioral science subjects do,86 Hargens found that behavioral science
papers (especially on rational expectations theory), not humanities papers, most overcited
foundational papers.87 Hargens was not certain of the explanation for these patterns, but he did
note that they might result from the different social characteristics of different fields:

in

convergent or urban fields, the need to cite foundational works should decrease for the duration
of consensus, since authors will not need to convince readers of the significance of their
contributions.88 This explanation was consistent with Hargens’s finding that scholars in different
areas used citations differently within their work.

In fields in which authors overcited

foundational papers, they also used more “orienting research lists” (similar to what lawyers know
as string cites) to “provide a framework for their work and imply that the framework constitutes
an acknowledged scholarly position,” as well as “a legitimate approach.”89
Although the focus of this study is on citation patterns, not all systematic analysis of the
material records of scholarly work has focused on citation networks. Academics have also
analyzed patterns in the content of scholarly publications and have found disciplinary differences
in this dimension as well.90 Work of both kinds validates some intuitions and conclusions
reached by other methods, but it also supplies detail unavailable to other models of research and
84

Id.
Earlier, Charles Bazerman proposed that scholars working in more contested fields, such as political science,
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can produce surprising information. Although the questions this kind of work can answer are
limited in scope, they are not limited by research area; there is no reason to think similar
approaches might not be fruitfully applied to legal scholarship.

B. The Analysis of Text Networks in Legal Scholarship
Given legal academics’ long traditions of self-scrutiny and self-defense, as well as their
longstanding tendency to borrow from other disciplines, it is surprising that no legal academics
have drawn on studies of textual practices to clarify their tasks and distinguish their work from
that of other academics, on the one hand, and lawyers, on the other. Legal academics have
indeed recognized the pertinence of citation analysis to their field (and even to their
understanding of their own work), but they have neglected the kind of work done by scholars
like Price and Hargens.91 This Part explores the limitations of the ways legal academics have
considered their own textual practices.
First-year law students quickly learn that text networks, as embodied in citations, are
crucial to the legal system. As Fred Shapiro has noted, “[l]inks between documents . . . are more
important in law than in any other discipline. . . . In judges’ opinions . . ., citation links . . . are
more significant than the words that surround the citations.”92 It is natural, then, that citation
practices within legal texts, especially judicial opinions, would have become a subject of interest
to legal scholars. They have studied patterns of judicial citation of prior judicial precedent93 and
patterns of judicial citation of other sources, including scholarly materials.94 Anxieties about the
value and purposes of legal scholarship have led to comparisons, already mentioned, of the ways
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that judicial opinions and other legal scholarship cite law review articles.95 In both areas,
citation patterns follow the power law identified by Price96 and seem unrelated to the quality of
the cited materials, however that quality might be evaluated, echoing his “cumulative advantage”
principle.97

In at least some areas, too, legal academics have observed the formation of

“invisible colleges,” although, again, they do not follow Price’s account of the phenomenon.98
Legal scholars have explicitly recognized that citation analysis offers “grist” for “a
sociology of legal scholarship.”99 But although they seem eager to study networks of legal texts,
they have produced few detailed studies of text networks within legal scholarship itself.100 There
is a tinge of embarrassment to legal academics’ work on scholarly citation practices, which has
mostly been limited to examining and comparing the numbers of citations individual articles
receive.101 In fact, the most sophisticated studies of textual practices in legal scholarship to date
have been produced not by legal academics but by scholars in other fields:

journalism,

communications, and rhetoric.
The only study of legal scholarship to draw on Price’s work in particular compared
citation patterns in law review articles addressing media law with patterns in work on the same
topic published in media and communications studies journals.102 The authors found that “law
review citations [tend to be to more] recent materials, while citations in mass communication

95

See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Heavily Cited Articles in Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 825 (1996); Mann, supra note 94; Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2; Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some
Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 n.150 (1992); Shapiro, supra note 49; Shapiro, Yale, supra
note 78; Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 92.
96
See, e.g., Sirico & Drew, supra note 94, at 1058-60 (showing predominance of citations to three law reviews
and to recent articles in circuit court memorandum opinions); Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 888, 899-908.
97
See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 77, at 846; Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling Value of Law Reviews:
An Exploration of Citations and Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238 (2009); Ronen Perry, The Relative Value
of American Law Reviews: Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3, 4, 34 (2006).
98
See especially Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563, 566 (1981) (concluding, based on “informal sociogram,” i.e., social-network diagram,
of citations in high-profile scholarship on civil rights, that “mainstream writers [in this area] tend to acknowledge
only each other’s work”).
99
Shapiro, Yale, supra note 78, at 1457.
100
See, e.g., Ayres & Vars, supra note 95, at 427-28.
101
Id. at 447 (“Citations analysis . . . unavoidably has a gossipy and at times tawdry aspect. We are drawn to
citation rankings . . . but we are simultaneously repulsed by them . . . .”). See also Brophy, supra note 97, at 232;
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journals are to much older publications” and that “mass communication scholars cite their law
school colleagues often, but citations in the opposite direction are much less frequent.”103 They
hypothesized that legal scholarship might more generally tend to be more cumulative—akin to
the scientific work produced during periods of normal science—than communications
scholarship,104 or, alternatively, that “mass communication media law scholars are engaged in a
somewhat more theoretically grounded enterprise that focuses more on the big questions in
media law jurisprudence.”105 A more recent study of textual practices in law review writing
reached some similar conclusions.106 This analysis of grammatical and rhetorical features of law
review pieces on a particular topic (the arbitrability of claims by nonparties to arbitration
agreements) found that the pieces seemed to resemble behavioral science scholarship—
especially “literature reviews”—more than humanities scholarship.107
No legal academic seems to have made comparable use of the analysis of textual
practices in legal academic work.108 This might be just happenstance—maybe no legal academic
has been well positioned to make this integration. Or it might be a matter of the difficulties of
identifying boundaries between research areas in law; many of the most interesting analyses of
the material records of academic work take a comparative approach, but such an approach
requires consensus on the units to be compared. Departmental divisions in universities provide a
natural focal point, but American law schools lack any analogous internal institutional feature.109
It cannot be, however, that legal academics have neglected these approaches because they are
irrelevant to legal academics’ concerns. Legal academics’ work is at least as much constituted
by citation networks as that generated by other academics. And plenty of legal academics have
speculated about the social and institutional determinants of legal scholarship; they have just
103
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tended to draw on different disciplines to do so, and to focus on the scholarship’s content,
themes, and format, instead of its other textual features.110 The neglect of these approaches in
legal self-scrutiny probably has more to do with the fact that they have been developed in
relatively low-status academic specialties. Legal scholars tend to borrow from other disciplines
to enhance the claim of their own work to serious scholarly status, and the current disciplinary
status hierarchy privileges the pure, hard disciplines over others.111 While bibliometrics and
citation analysis are cognitively hard, they are also associated with issues that have a decidedly
“applied” status within law schools—the details and mechanics of academic and professional
textual practices.
Somewhat inconsistently, legal academics are quite interested in the textual practices of
judges and other nonacademic powerholders and seem to accord relatively high status to the
detailed analysis of these practices.112 In this area, legal academics have long recognized—and
capitalized on—the functional overlap between academic professionalism and legal
professionalism, both of them areas in which the principal forms of expertise concern the
processing and generation of texts. This overlap may partly explain why legal scholarship in this
area seems relatively immune to anxieties about the value and purposes of legal scholarship.
Academics in any discipline have expertise in the analysis and generation of texts, so their
statements on that subject appear inherently valuable.113 And because so much of what lawyers
and judges do involves texts, scholarship addressing such practices would seem to be an easy
“sell” to those who have to try to solve textual puzzles—justifying their solutions by reference to
other texts—on the ground.114 If legal scholarship on the subject of interpretation has a special
status, then, it may be as much a product of blindness to and elision of the conditions of that
scholarship’s production as of a convergence of interests and objectives. The next two Parts of
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this article explore the expressions and implications of these possibilities in scholarship on legal
interpretation published in American law reviews since the 1890s.

III. THE PATHS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP
This Part and the next are based on a study of the 154 most-cited articles on general
topics in legal interpretation published in American law reviews between the late nineteenth
century and the present.115 This Part considers the content and themes of some of this work; the
next considers the citation network generated by the articles.

A. Progenitors: Thayer and Holmes
The two earliest pieces in the group are James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 article The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law116 and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
1899 essay The Theory of Legal Interpretation.117 Together, these pieces established a lasting
framework for scholarship on legal interpretation. Thayer’s article addresses a narrow question
but identified a number of issues that still await resolution; Holmes’s addresses a broader topic
but offered no specific prescription. Although neither piece had the direct impact on legal
doctrine of the Brandeis-Warren or Charles Warren articles, both have been cited an unusually
large number of times in judicial decisions as well as subsequent scholarship. The relative
popularity of the pieces in these two arenas, however, suggests an unexpected configuration of
interests.
The “doctrine of constitutional law” mentioned in Thayer’s title is the practice of judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislative enactments.118 Thayer’s article is best known for its
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articulation of a standard of near-total judicial deference to the constitutionality of legislative
action. Thayer argues that any power that courts might have to review the constitutionality of
legislation has important limitations, which Thayer infers from the implied powers granted to the
legislature to “interpret” the Constitution in the process of its enactment of laws:
it is the legislature to whom this power is given,—this power, not merely of
enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall
deeply affect the whole country, enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the
most serious affairs. . . . It is plain that where a power so momentous as this
primary power to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the body to
whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect. . . . 119
Thayer’s characterization of the legislature’s “power to interpret” as awesome and potentially
threatening contrasts with what he describes as the “pedantic and academic” nature of workaday
legal interpretation by judges:
The court’s duty, we are told [by those defending a plenary power of judicial
review], is the mere and simple office of construing two writings and comparing
one with another, as two contracts or two statutes are construed and compared
when they are said to conflict; of declaring the true meaning of each . . . an
ordinary and humble judicial duty, as the courts sometimes describe it. . . .
[Judicial review so conceived involves] a pedantic and academic treatment of the
texts of the constitution and the laws.120
This basic distinction between legislative interpretation of the constitution and judicial
interpretation of other legal texts is the core of Thayer’s argument for judicial restraint.121
Ordinary legal interpretation involves an effort to “ascertain or apply [the] true meaning” of a
text, an area in which judges have expertise, if of a “humble” sort. Judicial review, in contrast,
concerns “whether legislation is sustainable or not,” not the “true meaning of the constitution.”122
According to Thayer, judges have the capacity—perhaps—to make the former kind of judgment,
but not the latter, partly because no such “true meaning” really exists: “the constitution often
admits of different interpretations; . . . . the constitution does not impose on the legislature any

and to treat them as null.” Thayer, supra note 116, at 129.
119
Id. at 136.
120
Id. at 138.
121
Id. at 143-44 (“If [the courts’] duty were in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain the meaning of the text of
the constitution and of the impeached Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an academic question, whether in
the court’s judgment the two were in conflict, it would . . . be an elevated and important office . . . but yet a function
far simpler than it actually is.”); see also id. at 139, 141, 150, 151.
122
Id. at 150.
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one specific opinion, but leaves open [a] range of choice.”123 By distinguishing judicial from
legislative interpretive expertise in this way, Thayer avoided addressing the question that has
vexed many subsequent lawyers and judges, including Holmes: to what extent do all legal texts
“admit[] of different interpretations”?

Later writers have also continued to wrestle with

questions directly raised by Thayer, such as the scope of legislative supremacy, as well as with
themes implicit in his argument, especially his ambivalent characterization of interpretation as
simultaneously awesome and petty.124
In the seven years between the publication of Thayer’s article and Holmes’s, the Supreme
Court cited a law review article for the first time in an opinion.125 And at the time Holmes’ short
piece appeared, he had been serving on the bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for seventeen years. Despite Holmes’s presumably practical perspective, his chief
topic in this piece was highly abstract: the determinacy of meaning of words in legal documents.
Holmes distinguished between meaning in theory and meaning in practice in a way that recalls
Thayer’s distinction between judicial and legislative interpretation: “It is true that in theory any
document purporting to . . . have some legal effect has one meaning and no other . . . . It is not
true that in practice . . . a given word or even a given collocation of words has one meaning and
no other.”126 But Holmes had more to say about the nature of interpretation than Thayer had;
Holmes described the process as based on the interpreter’s understanding of “the general usages
of speech” and as a matter of surrendering to “whatever galvanic current may come from the rest
of the instrument.”127 Holmes’s focus on meaning in practice as a function of usage is the core
of his objective theory of meaning, the point for which this article is best known. An important
implication of the theory is that interpretation requires no special expertise beyond familiarity
with linguistic usage. Thus, Holmes presented the theory as applicable to the interpretation of all
kinds of legal documents; while “[d]ifferent rules might conceivably be laid down for the
construction of different kinds of writing,” “in fact we do not deal differently with a statute from
123

Id. at 144; see also id. at 150 (“[A] court cannot always, and for the purpose of all sorts of questions, say that
there is but one right and permissible way of interpreting the constitution.”).
124
Id. at 156 n.1 (citing 1 Bryce, Am. Com., 1st ed., 377).
125
See McClintock, supra note 94, at 666 (discussing earliest Supreme Court citation of law review article in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts and
Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128, 129 (1890))).
126
Holmes, supra note 117, at 417.
127
Id.
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our way of dealing with a contract.”128 This conception of interpretation, however, presented a
paradox: if interpretation was the simple yet ineffable phenomenon Holmes claimed it was, did
it need to be (or could it be) theorized at all? Holmes concluded his piece by suggesting that it
did, but his explanation was less than detailed:
It may be, after all, that the matter is one in which the important thing, the law, is
settled, and different people will account for it by such theory as pleases them
best. . . . But although practical men generally prefer to leave their major
premises inarticulate, yet even for practical purposes theory generally turns out
the most important thing in the end. I am far from saying that it might not make a
difference in the old question to which I have referred.129
Holmes’s quandary anticipates contemporary anxieties about the purposes and value of legal
scholarship.130 Should it present the arguments that judges would make, if they only had time,131
or should it do something else—and if so, what? Holmes’s consideration of, and inability to
answer, this question, along with his highly abstract theme, affected later use of his piece by
legal academics and professionals.
While Thayer assumed that diverse constitutional meanings were possible, his main point
was that judicial practices must be restrained; the Constitution tells us that it is the legislature
that is the expert on which of its acts are consistent with the document’s commands. Holmes’s
point was the reverse: because meaning is stabilized by usage, all judges have interpretive
expertise, as lawyers do too, and we do not need to worry too much about checking judicial
statements about the meaning of texts. This is the most fundamental contrast between the two
pieces, and it marks out a polarity that still structures discussion. Yet even though Thayer
seemed to offer a more explicit formula for judicial decision making, Holmes’s article has been
cited in nearly three times as many judicial opinions as Thayer’s.132

Courts cite Holmes

primarily to support assertions about the plain meaning of legal text. The popularity of the
pieces among academics is the reverse.133 This suggests that commentators are more interested
128

Id. at 419. Holmes also maintained that the same principles applied to the interpretation of wills. Id.
Id. at 420.
130
See supra note 6.
131
See, e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 43, at 778-79.
132
Holmes’s piece has been cited 62 times in judicial opinions, Thayer’s 23 times. Search run on “thayer /s
scope /s 129” and “holmes /s theory /s 417” in Westlaw ALLCASES database on Dec. 14, 2010.
133
Thayer’s article has been cited 746 times in commentary since its publication; Holmes’s has been cited only
306 times.
129
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than courts in formulas conducive to limiting the scope of judicial authority, and less interested
in confirming their own self-conscious reflections on what it is they are doing. Since legal
academics are engaged in a normative, interpretive activity that is superficially similar to judges’
activities, these academics have an interest in describing judicial power as limited and asserting
their own competence to do so: they are competing with courts for expertise-based authority in
this area.

B. The Withering of Interest in Contract Interpretation
Both Thayer and Holmes discussed contract interpretation and statutory interpretation as
essentially equivalent practices, as seems to have been common at the time.134 But over the
century since they wrote—particularly since the 1980s—this presupposition has become less
common. Broad-spectrum scholarly interest in the interpretation of contracts (as opposed to
other framings of the treatment of contracts, e.g., their design and the design of rules for their
enforcement) has declined. This trend is probably regrettable.
Only six of the articles in the group assembled for this study address primarily contract
interpretation (in contrast, 45 address constitutional interpretation, and 69 address statutory
interpretation). Only three of these six were published after 1990, and the title of only one of
those three makes it evident that the article does address contract interpretation.135 It is not
apparent from this that contracts scholars are writing less about interpretation. The study shows
only that scholarly work on contract interpretation receives fewer citations, and apparently less
attention, across the scholarly spectrum than work on other types of legal interpretation does.
This could be because scholars interested in public law do not tend to consult contracts
scholarship, and not because contracts scholars do not find contract interpretation worth
investigating.136 However, the content of the pieces on contract interpretation that did qualify for
inclusion in the study does suggest that contracts scholars’ interest has shifted away from issues
134

The same presupposition appears half a century later in Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950), which is in the group of articles assembled for this study.
135
Compare David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991), with Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1990); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits
of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
136
Cf., e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009) (“Issues of contract
interpretation . . . . probably are the most frequently litigated issues on the civil side of the judicial docket.”).
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of verbal meaning and toward issues of institutional design and information management, often
conceived as involving forms of expertise more akin to technical skill than to interpretive or
linguistic competence.137
The ebbing of interest in issues of contract interpretation among scholars interested in
legal interpretation more generally seems unfortunate.

The issues addressed by contracts

theorists do have important parallels in other areas of law.138

We might understand the

redirection of contract scholars’ attention from issues of verbal meaning to issues of institutional
design and information management as reflecting a practical recognition that academics are
unlikely to settle abstract issues of meaning, especially the nature of meaning, while they might
be able to reach some consensus on acceptable instruments for the management of meaning. If
this is true, public law scholars’ refusal to follow suit may reinforce the likelihood that they will
continue to debate fundamental issues without reaching agreement.

C. The Chevron Phenomenon
Thayer and Holmes of course did not anticipate every feature of later legal interpretation
scholarship. When they wrote, for example, administrative agencies were far less numerous and
powerful than they are today, so it is not surprising that neither of them addressed how agency
officials might interpret legal texts, or how such interpretations should be treated by courts
(although they have both been cited in work addressing these issues). The earliest article on that
topic in the group assembled for this study is Henry Monaghan’s 1983 article Marbury and the
Administrative State.139 Monaghan’s approach to the issue, framed as a rebuttal of Thayer,
anticipated the approach used by the Supreme Court in its Chevron decision the next year140 as
well as in later academic work on the topic. Since the mid-1980s, the amount of academic work

137

One of the main points of David Charny’s 1991 article on “the normative structure of contract interpretation”
is that issues of institutional design and information management have more to do with the interpretation of
contracts than scholars are prone to think. Charny, supra note 135.
138
See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION
(2008); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986).
139
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
140
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron opinion did not cite Monaghan’s article.
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on this topic has dramatically increased,141 and Chevron-focused pieces seem to accrue citations
more rapidly than articles on other legal interpretation topics.142 But Monaghan’s article was not
simply a well-timed anticipation of issues that would shortly become significant as a result of
real-world legal developments.

The flood of scholarship on the topic seems due to other

institutional developments as well, including developments specific to the academy.
As noted, Monaghan presented his investigation of the nature and scope of judicial power
to review administrative agency decisions as, in part, a response to Thayer’s deference thesis.143
Monaghan rejected Thayer’s “effort to divorce meaning from validity”144 and argued that the
decision in Marbury v. Madison145 demonstrated the inaccuracy of Thayer’s distinction between
legal interpretation and judicial review. In Marbury and since, Monaghan contended, the judicial
role in passing on the constitutionality of legislation has indeed been understood as a matter of
interpretation, and in this, it is just like judicial review of administrative action.146 Monaghan
agreed with Thayer, however, that judges do not have a monopoly on interpretive authority, but
“share[]” “responsibility for meaning” with agencies: “the judicial role is to specify what the
statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that it does mean.”147
The next year, the Supreme Court approved the Environmental Protection Agency’s
interpretation of the Clean Air Act to permit the expansion of existing industrial installations
without pollution-reducing upgrades.148 Chevron is best known not for its facts but for its
articulation of a standard for judicial review of agency action.

The standard involved a

Monaghan-style conception of the expertise involved in judicial and agency activities as, above
all, text-focused and interpretive: Chevron instructed courts, in reviewing agency action, first to
interpret the legislation at issue to determine whether Congress had “spoken directly to the
141

Of the 109 articles in Appendix A published since 1983, 55 concern statutory interpretation, and 17 concern
agency interpretation in particular.
142
The article with the third-highest weighted citation count among articles on statutory interpretation in the
study concerns Chevron, as does the most recent article on the list. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (third-highest weighted citation count among articles addressing
statutory interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (most recent).
143
See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 7-11.
144
Id. at 14; see also id. at 8, 13 n.75.
145
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
146
Monaghan, supra note 139, at 6 (“[J]udicial review in both constitutional and administrative law involves
textual interpretation by the courts.”) (emphasis in original).
147
Id. at 27.
148
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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precise question” and, if it had not, to defer to the agency’s “permissible construction” of the
statute.149
Despite Chevron’s now-canonical status, commentators did not immediately herald it as
dominating the doctrine in this area. The first article on the subject following Monaghan’s in the
group assembled for this study postdated Chevron but cited the case only once.150 Not until 1989
did commentators begin describing Chevron, initially with reservations, as a sea change.151 The
belated recognition of Chevron as a watershed by commentators was not just a reaction152 to the
decision but also an effect of an explosion of scholarship concerning the case’s significance and
implementation. The flowering of scholarship on this topic coincided with a more general
flowering of high-profile work on legal interpretation, especially statutory interpretation, in the
1980s.153 The group of works assembled for this study is dominated by more recent articles, and
especially by articles published between 1983 and 1992.154 The period was marked not just by
increased output but also by increased use of other disciplinary resources. These trends were
themselves the focus of several articles in the group assembled for this study.155
This context of the flowering of Chevron scholarship itself occurred within an even
broader context: the contemporary exacerbation of a perceived divide between the academy and
the culture at large that destabilized traditional conceptions of the purposes of academic work

149
150

Id. at 842-43.
Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 596 n.250

(1985).
151

Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 452, 456 (1989); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 512 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445
(1989).
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See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1883-85 (arguing that all legal scholarship is necessarily “reactive”).
153
See Rubin, supra note 13, at 932-33; Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of
Meaning or Re-Inscription of Hierarchy?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 657 (1992).
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The earliest year covered in Appendix A represented by more than four articles is 1982. Four articles on the
list (three of them on constitutional interpretation) were published in 1975; four were published in 1981 (again
including three on constitutional interpretation). For the 1982 to 1991 period, the list includes 7 articles from 1983;
3 from 1984; 7 from 1985; 5 from 1986; 9 from 1987; 7 from 1988; 9 from 1989; 12 from 1990; 6 from 1991; and
from 1992. During this period, only one year produced fewer than five articles that eventually received more than
100 citations.
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See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); J.M.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive
Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992).
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and put added pressure on academics to legitimate that work.156 Andrew Abbott’s work has
suggested, and shown, that when an academic community experiences this kind of pressure,
those at the core of the community will emphasize their control over abstract resources that they
can define themselves—they withdraw into “pure work”157—and will seek new conceptual
territory to occupy by bridging existing subject areas and by drawing new “fractal” distinctions
between their own and previous work.158 The work on Chevron from the late 1980s on typifies
such responses. After Monaghan and then the Court identified an abstract, theorizable, and
textual core to the problem of judicial review of agency action, legal scholars eventually
recognized an opportunity to claim expertise in this “pure” domain and to justify their claim by
reference to multiple bodies of prior scholarship. And as is illustrated by the most recent article
in the study, Cass Sunstein’s Chevron Step Zero,159 “fractalization” has continued to occur even
within this new subfield: over time, the most visible articles on the topic have increasingly
focused on analyzing components of the Chevron “two-step” rather than the doctrine’s place
within the legal system.
The appearance of this subfield, then, may be as much a product of forces mostly internal
to the academy as of forces clearly outside it, like the Chevron decision itself. This aspect of
their activity has remained largely unseen by the academics involved, who remain preoccupied
with the issues that divided Thayer and Holmes: the tension between subjective and objective
conceptions of verbal and legal meaning, and more fundamentally, the appropriate scope of
interpretive authority and the location of interpretive expertise.

IV. CITATION PATTERNS AND PRACTICES
More general features of the group of articles covered in this study include the citation
links between the articles on the list, and the network created by these links, addressed in this
Part.160 The characteristics of this network confirm that academics themselves continue to treat
156

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See ABBOTT, supra note 63, at 22.
158
Id. at 130, 230-31.
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Sunstein, supra note 142.
160
Most studies of citation networks begin by collecting all articles published on a particular topic during a
particular period. For the present study, this would be all articles published on general topics in legal interpretation
between 1893 and 2010. The absence of machine indexing of the kind needed made this approach impossible for
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scholarship on legal interpretation as a coherent research area. It also reinforces the conclusions
suggested in the previous Part: even though, at certain points, this scholarship has been read
mostly by other scholars, many of those working in the area seem to lack an accurate sense of the
overall shape of their field and the implications this context has for their asserted aims.

A. Cross-Citation and Embeddedness
To analyze the citation relationships among the articles, I identified all citations to prior
articles by subsequent articles in the group and divided the 154 articles into four categories,
based on the type of legal instrument addressed by each article. The two largest categories
contain articles addressing constitutional interpretation (44 articles) and statutory interpretation
(67 articles). A small group contains articles addressing contract interpretation (6 articles).
About a fifth of the articles explicitly consider multiple types of legal text or the nature of verbal
meaning in general as it relates to legal practices (37 articles).
The citation links among the articles in the whole list and in different subcategories create
a “directed” network, one in which the connections between members of the population are oneway.161 Directed networks differ from nondirected ones. In a nondirected network, connections
between members are symmetrical. A telephone network is an example: if I can call you on the
phone, you can call me. In a directed network, like a citation network, the existence of a link
between two members does not enable both linked members equally: if my article cites your
article, it does not necessarily follow that your article cites my article. In a directed network, one
can not only identify the most-linked articles, but also, among other things, compare articles’
outgoing connections (their citations of other articles), or “outdegree,” and their incoming
connections (citations of them by others), or “indegree.”162
As Appendix B shows, the articles as a group form a single connected network (with a
few entirely isolated members). Although articles in each subcategory tend to be most connected
to others in the same subcategory, no subcategory is entirely isolated. This feature of the

this study. A smaller study may still be valuable, since citation networks are scale-free in most regards. See supra
notes 68. In assessing characteristics of this network, I adjusted my conclusions to take the limited size of the
population into account.
161
See, e.g., Newman, supra note 70, at 173, 176-78.
162
See, e.g., id.
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network might suggest that legal academics generally assume, with Holmes and Monaghan, that
different actors’ determinations of the meanings of different kinds of legal texts are comparable
activities.

But the network’s interconnectedness is probably also a record of the kind of

“jurisdictional” competition theorized by Abbott163 and evidence that the dynamics of legal
scholarship in this area differ from that in some others.164 Institutional pressures impel scholars
to divide their topics into increasingly smaller and more abstract bits, but at the same time to tie
their work to existing literature as broadly as possible.
These observations are supported by consideration of the articles’ in- and outdegree
characteristics.165 Although the article with the highest indegree (cited by other articles in the list
the greatest number of times) was in the constitutional law category,166 16 of the 20 articles with
the highest indegree167 were in the statutory interpretation category,168 and more than half of the
20 articles with the highest outdegree were in the same category.169 This dominance is partly
due to the size of the statutory interpretation subcategory, its prevalence since the 1980s,170 and
the fact that over the past several decades, the average number of citations per article has been
growing. But the indegree of the most highly cited articles is disproportionate to their numerical
dominance. Over time, articles within the theoretical core of this research area seem to be citing
each other more frequently, across subcategory lines. The often-noted increasing length and
number of citations of law review articles might reflect not just a kind of arms race171 but also
163

See supra notes 157159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102107 and accompanying text.
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Of the 13 articles with an indegree of zero (i.e., cited by no other articles in the list), eight were published
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the increasing complexity of the terrain within which some legal academics are trying to stake
out their conceptual territory. In the absence of an institutional consensus on the shape and aims
of legal scholarship, as each writer seeks to ground a new work’s claim to relevance and
legitimacy, the writer has to invoke a constantly increasing number of reference points.
A similar story seems to be told by another feature of the network: the relationship
between articles’ rate of citation by other articles in the study and their rate of citation overall.
Articles with a higher measure on this feature would seem to be relatively more visible to other
scholars working on general legal interpretation topics (more deeply embedded in the core
theoretical part of the field), and relatively less visible (or useful) to scholars working on specific
topics in legal interpretation (e.g., advocating a particular understanding of a particular text) or in
other areas. The articles with the highest measure on this feature were disproportionately
produced during the 1982 to 1991 period discussed above172 and overlap only minimally with the
articles on the list that have earned the greatest number of judicial citations.173 In other words,
much of the most visible scholarship produced during that fruitful period has earned its citations
disproportionately from other jurisdiction-defining work on general topics in interpretation,
rather than from the scholarly community at large or from judicial citation. The claim to
authority to define interpretive expertise in these theoretical works has become self-fulfilling,
primarily within a closed community of academics.

B. Macro-Patterns and Micro-Rhetoric
This, of course, is the fear of many legal academics and the charge made by many of their
174

critics.

Understanding how legal scholarship fits into the wider disciplinary field could go far

toward addressing these fears and criticisms by helping to clarify the actual shape of that
scholarship as a literature. As noted in Part II, this is exactly what some bibliometric work tries
to do. The work done on legal scholarship so far has proposed that in certain areas, this
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Of the 21 articles with the highest measure on this feature, 16 were published between 1982 and 1991. (The
same period was responsible for a lower proportion of articles overall, 85 of 150.)
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The only articles on both lists were Holmes, supra note 117; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); and Richard Pildes, Note, Intent, Clear
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scholarship most resembles “cumulating” scientific scholarship.175

The group of articles

considered in this study does not fit this pattern. But there is a tension between the macro-shape
of the citation network created by these articles and much of the micro-rhetoric they contain.
In the natural sciences, citation patterns have mostly been found to follow a “research
front” model consistent with Kuhn’s conception of progress during periods of normal science.
Plotted on a grid, which registers cited articles in rows and citing articles in columns, with a
mark at the intersections of citing columns and cited rows, this type of pattern clusters citations
along the diagonal representing the research front.176 Random citation practices scatter citation
marks more evenly throughout the triangular portion of the grid; overcitation of foundational
sources clusters citations along the top rows of the grid. These two patterns are characteristic of
the humanities and social sciences.177 As Appendix C shows, overall, the articles considered in
this study cite other articles in the study in a random-citation pattern, with citations distributed
throughout the grid. But during some periods—especially 1982 to 1987 and 1991 to 2000—the
body of the grid empties out a bit, and citations cluster more along the diagonal. The overall
pattern displayed by this particular group of articles, then, confirms Becher’s characterization of
law as a soft discipline lacking convergence.178 It would make sense for this characterization to
be especially accurate with respect to subfields of academic law that deal with such abstract and
contested concepts as textual meaning.
This conclusion is not surprising, since the field in question has traditionally borrowed
often and heavily from the humanities. All the same, most legal scholars, including those writing
in the areas studied here, adopt a rhetoric more characteristic of the sciences: the “‘anti-rhetoric’
of legal discourse closely parallels the conventional view of modern scientific discourse,”
overusing abstract grammatical agents and describing power relations mostly in mechanistic
terms.179 The presence of such rhetoric is probably overdetermined in this specific area. Not just
a form of false consciousness, it is a product of the plural normative and discursive systems to
which legal academics owe allegiance and within which they seek to justify their activities. Such
175
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rhetoric lends scholarly descriptions and prescriptions a “hardness” that can establish and clarify
legal scholars’ expertise vis-à-vis legal decision makers. But it is an unstable rhetoric, especially
in work that by its very nature seeks to both capitalize on and deny the role played by
interpretation in other academic and professional discourses.
The result is an “invisible college” that is also a “Tower of Babel.”180 The constant
churning at the center of this field, which is continually reorienting itself with respect to its own
foundational texts and other disciplinary vocabularies, exacerbates this dynamic.

As legal

academics seek to establish their expertise with respect to particular interpretive issues, they
fracture the field, increasing the opportunities for claiming expertise, but also pin their claims to
heterogeneous vocabularies, probably making those claims more tenuous.

CONCLUSION
Legal academics’ willingness to consider the institutional determinants of their scholarly
output has been oddly limited. In particular, they have resisted examining what the texts they
produce have to tell them about the value and nature of their collective efforts. This resistance is
especially confounding in the area of scholarship on topics in legal interpretation, in which
scholarly awareness of the systemic significance of the written word has always been acute.
American legal academics’ output in this area supports intuitions about the peculiar status of
legal scholarship among the academic disciplines and in relation to professional legal discourse,
but also suggests that this status carries special dangers, even as it makes work in this area
especially attractive. This article does not hope to offer the last word on the topic, but seeks only
to persuade readers that systematic analysis of the kind sketched here might help legal academics
reach more agreement about what their work does and should achieve.
***
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Cf. Eleanor Marie Brown, The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and
“Mainstream” Civil Rights Scholarship, 103 YALE L.J. 513, 515-16 (1995).
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APPENDIX A
MOST-CITED AMERICAN LAW REVIEW ARTICLES ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION
This appendix lists the 154 most-cited articles published in American law reviews on
general issues in legal interpretation. It includes studies of interpretive practice and authority, as
well as analyses of the role of interpretation in legal reasoning and defenses or critiques of
particular interpretive methods. It also includes articles focusing on specific categories of legal
texts (such as contracts, constitutions, and statutes), specific interpreters, and specific interpretive
principles. But it does not include articles focusing on the meaning of specific legal texts or on
specific doctrinal areas, such as the interpretation of environmental statutes.
The list was compiled from a list of the articles published in American law reviews,
indexed in Hein Online, containing the word “interpretation,” and cited more than 100 times (by
Hein Online’s count). Hein Online was used because of the greater historical coverage of its law
review database.
Articles are listed in the order of citation frequency, that is, total number of citations in
Hein Online.

This list also includes weighted citation information, corresponding to the

approximate number of citations of the article per year since its publication, based on the
approximate number of possible citations in an American law review as of the article’s year of
publication. Some articles are marked with asterisks. The number of citations listed for these
articles is likely underreported because the articles in question, or significant portions of them,
were later republished in frequently cited books.
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Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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No. cites
1170

Weighted
1.510

912

.745

833

1.333

803

.608

779

.577

18-Feb-11]

LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP

Article
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739 (1982).
16. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
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Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
48. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43
HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
49. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
50. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
51. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1999).
52. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
53. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
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APPENDIX B
GRAPH OF CITATION NETWORK
The draft graph below displays the citation connections among the articles in Appendix
A. It was created using Gephi, an open-source graph visualization software package that allows
the creation and analysis of directed social-network graphs. (Additional detail can be added to
the graph to clarify the relations among subcategories of articles.)
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APPENDIX C
CITATION REFERENCE GRAPH
This graph also shows the citation relations among the articles listed in Appendix A.
Each row represents an article available for citation, ordered chronologically from top to bottom.
Each column represents an article that could have made citations of another article in the
appendix. An “X” marks the spot where each article listed in a column cites any prior articles
listed in the rows. Thus, the patterns of citation over time may be read from left to right in the
graph.

